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I. INTRODUCTION
The transmission of unsolicited commercial email, also known as
spam, has gained popularity as a means for advertising because of its
minimal cost to the advertiser. It is estimated that 80.3 trillion unso-
licited email messages are sent each year, with an average of 220 mil-
lion messages sent each day.1 Approximately three out of ten email
messages are spam, 2 and over 30% of those emails contain sexually ex-
plicit material.3 Though the transmission of email may be basically
free to the advertiser, costs are imposed both on the Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) and on the ultimate recipients of the messages.
Historically, states have attempted to regulate unsolicited email
through legislation but have failed because the courts have generally
held that these laws violate the dormant Commerce Clause due to the
laws' extraterritorial impact.4 Consequently, the dormant Commerce
Clause has been referred to as "a nuclear bomb of a legal theory"
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against state Internet regulations.' However, a recent State Supreme
Court decision upholding Washington's spain law, State v. Heckel,
has defused the "nuclear bomb" with respect to the regulation of
unsolicited email in Washington.6
The outcome of Heckel not only affects future litigation, it also
enables the Washington State Legislature to amend the current legis-
lation to eliminate the flow of unsolicited sexually explicit commercial
email within Washington State. While there are Washington laws
that make it unlawful to sell, distribute, or display erotic (hereafter re-
ferred to as "sexually explicit") material to a minor,7 there are no laws
that proscribe the transmission of this material through email. The
current spam law prohibits the transmission of unsolicited email that
contains misleading subject headers or transmission paths, but it is si-
lent regarding messages with sexually explicit material.8 Thus, while
the Washington legislature has expressed an interest in protecting
children from harmful material, it has failed to enact laws in an area
where the transmission of sexually explicit material is prevalent.9
Because the state of Washington has a compelling interest in pro-
tecting the moral and psychological welfare of its children,1" the cur-
rent spam law should be amended to also proscribe the transmission of
unsolicited sexually explicit commercial email within its borders. This
article argues that such an amendment would not violate either the
dormant Commerce Clause or the First Amendment. In support of
this thesis, section II first addresses the pervasive problem of chil-
dren-not just adults-receiving sexually explicit material via unsolic-
ited email. Then, sections III through V discuss the implications of
the dormant Commerce Clause, the First Amendment, and the policy
considerations that support elimination of unsolicited sexually explicit
email.
5. Id.
6. State v. Heckel, 143 Wash. 2d 824, 24 P.3d 404 (2001), cert. denied, 2001 WL 1117516
(2001).
7. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68.060 (2001). "Erotic" has been defined as
printed material, photographs, pictures, motion pictures, sound recordings, and other
material the dominant theme of which taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest
of minors in sex; which is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary com-
munity standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters or
sado-masochistic abuse; and is utterly without redeeming social value.
Id. A minor is any person under the age of eighteen years. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68.050
(2001).
8. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.190.020 (2001).
9. See McGuire, supra note 3.
10. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968).
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II. THE EXPOSURE OF SEXUALLY EXPLICIT EMAIL TO CHILDREN
In 2000, 54 million households in the United States had at least
one computer. Of those households, at least one member of the
household was connected to the Internet." Moreover, public schools
educate children on how to use a computer and access the Internet. 12
Internet access is not exclusive to adults; children have access and are
connecting at home. 3 Nine out of ten children (ages 6 to 17) had ac-
cess to a computer in 2000; three out often use the Internet at home. 4
Of all the applications available, email is the easiest and most common
Internet application used at home.'" Seventy-four percent of the chil-
dren who are connected to the Internet at home use email. 1 6
The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children re-
cently surveyed 1,501 young people, ages 10 to 17, who regularly use
the Internet. 7 Of those young people, 25% reported being exposed to
unwanted sexual pictures in the last year, and 28% of those exposures
occurred either while opening email, after clicking a hyperlink in
email, or while instant messaging." The content of these messages fell
into one of three categories: (1) messages containing nudity; (2) per-
sons engaged in intercourse; or (3) violence in addition to sex and/or
nudity."9 Twenty-three percent of the children who reported exposure
incidents stated that they were either very or extremely upset by the
content, which amounted to 6% of the total youth interviewed.2 °
Of the unwanted exposures that occurred through email, 63%
came to email addresses used solely by the youth.2' Additionally, in
93% of the occurrences, the message was sent from an unknown
11. Michael Pastore, Computer, Net Access Standard for Many Americans, Sept. 6, 2001, at
http://www.cyberatlas.Internet.com/bigpicture/demographics/article/0,1323,5901-879441,00
.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2002).
12. "By the fall of 2000, almost all public schools had access to the Internet: 98 percent
were connected." Anne Cattagni & Elizabeth Farris, Internet Access in U.S. Public Schools and
Classrooms: 1994-2000, STATISTICS IN BRIEF (National Center for Education Statistics, Wash.,
D.C.), May 2001, at 1, available at http://www.nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/2001071.pdf (last visited
Aug. 13, 2002).
13. Pastore, supra note 11.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. David Finkelhor, Kimberly J. Mitchell & Janis Wolak, Online Victimization: A Report
on the Nation's Youth (Crimes Against Children Research Center, Durham, N.H.), June 2000, at
9, available at http://www.missingkids.com/download/nc62.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2002).
18. Idat 26.
19. Id. at 27 (94% were of naked persons, 38% showed people having sex, and 8% involved
violence, in addition to nudity and/or sex).
20. Id. at 29.
21. Id. at 27.
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source. 22  Most of these exposures occurred while the youth was at
home, although some reported that they were exposed while using a
computer at school or in the library.23 Only 39% of these incidents
were disclosed to parents, and none were reported to a law enforce-
ment agency.24
III. UNSOLICITED EMAIL, THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE,
AND STATE V. HECKEL
Congress has the power to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions and among the several states.21 Implicit in this power is the dor-
mant Commerce Clause principle that prevents states from impermis-
sibly intruding on this exclusive federal power by enacting laws that
unduly burden interstate commerce.26 Courts generally follow an
analysis known as the Pike balancing test for determining whether a
state law is unconstitutional because it violates the dormant Com-
merce Clause.27
The Pike test is a two-step process. First, the court determines
whether or not the law openly discriminates against out-of-state busi-
ness interests in favor of intrastate businesses. 2' Laws that openly dis-
criminate against out-of-state interests are subject to the strictest scru-
tiny of the "purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of
nondiscriminatory alternatives. '29  Second, if the law applies even-
handedly to both inter- and intra-state businesses (i.e., it is facially
neutral), the court then must balance the local benefits provided by
the law against the interstate burdens imposed by the law."° If the law
promotes a legitimate state interest, it will be upheld unless the burden
on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the local
benefits the law creates.31 If the law survives this two-part analysis,
the court will next evaluate whether the law leads to inconsistent bur-
dens among the states or regulates extraterritorially.32
22. Id.
23. Id. Sixty-seven percent of these unwanted exposures occurred at home, 15% happened
at school, and 3% happened in a library.
24. Id. at 28.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
26. See, e.g., Healy v. The Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326 (1989); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987).
27. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
28. Heckel, 143 Wash. 2d at 832, 24 P.3d at 409.
29. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
30. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
31. Id.
32. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336; see also Heckel, 142 Wash. 2d at 838, 24 P.3d at 412.
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The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits laws that are inconsis-
tent with or that conflict with other states' laws. 3 The Commerce
Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising from the projec-
tion of one state regulatory scheme into the jurisdiction of another
state.34 Although the meaning of this requirement is generally un-
clear, it is established that it does not mandate state law uniformity."
Finally, the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits the "applica-
tion of state statutes to commerce that takes place wholly outside the
State's borders."36  The critical inquiry under the extraterritoriality
principle is "whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control
conduct beyond the boundaries of the State."37
In State v. Heckel, the Washington Supreme Court held that
Washington's Commercial Electronic Mail Act did not violate the
dormant Commerce Clause.38 This Act makes it unlawful to transmit
to a Washington resident or from a Washington computer commercial
email messages containing misrepresentations in either the subject line
or the transmission path.39 The statute responds to the concern of un-
solicited email messages (spam) that are misleading or fraudulent.4"
In upholding the statute, the court first recognized that the Act
did not discriminate against out-of-state interests in favor of Wash-
ington residents.41 The Act applies equally to both Washington resi-
dents and nonresidents.4 Thus, because the law does not openly dis-
criminate against out-of-state interests, strict scrutiny does not
apply.43
The court next moved to the second part of the dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis, which is a two-part inquiry: (1) whether Wash-
ington has a legitimate purpose for banning this type of email; and (2)
whether the burden on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in rela-
tion to the local benefits the law creates.44 The court first recognized
Washington's legitimate purpose in banning fraudulent or misleading
33. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
34. Id. at 337.
35. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 4, at 790.
36. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
37. Id.
38. Heckel, 143 Wash. 2d at 833, 24 P.3d at 409.
39. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.190.020 (2001).
40. Final Bill Report, ESHB 2752, 106th Cong. (1998), available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/1997-98/house/2750-2774/2752-s-fbr_040698.txt (last
visited August 28, 2002).
41. Heckel, 143 Wash. 2d at 833, 24 P.3d at 409.
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.190.020; see also Heckel, 143 Wash. 2d at 833, 24 P.3d at 409.
43. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337.
44. Heckel, 143 Wash. 2d at 832-33, 24 P.3d at 409.
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messages to alleviate the cost shifting inherent in the sending of decep-
tive spam.45
The state has a legitimate purpose in protecting the interests of
ISPs, owners of forged names, and email users. ISPs incur additional
costs attributable to spain because they have to purchase additional
computer equipment to handle the increased flow.4 6 Additionally,
more personnel need to be hired to handle the complaints about the
spam as well as to detect accounts being used to send out spam.47 Fur-
thermore, individual users are unable to distinguish spam from legiti-
mate personal or business messages, forcing them to spend valuable
time weeding out the wanted from the unwanted. These efforts take
time and cause frustration.48 "All internet users bear the cost of de-
ceptive spam."49
After finding that Washington has a legitimate purpose for ban-
ning fraudulent or misleading messages, the court applied the balanc-
ing test: if the burden imposed on interstate commerce clearly exceeds
the local benefits created by the law, the law is unconstitutional. so The
effectiveness of the law to create a local benefit must be assessed be-
fore it can be weighed against the burden imposed on interstate com-
merce."1 If the Commercial Electronic Mail Act does not effectively
redress the problem associated with fraudulent or misleading spain,
then it would run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause because
there would be no justification for burdening interstate commerce.5 2
The court held that the Act effectively protected ISPs and con-
sumers from the problems associated with spam for two reasons.
First, requiring truthful subject headers makes spamming less appeal-
ing to many spammers who send fraudulent messages, and will, there-
fore, reduce the volume of spam sent into Washington. 3 Second, the
ability to identify spam, without reading the content of commercial
spain alone, would enable a recipient to delete the message without
opening it and thereby avoid offensive content. 5 4
Balancing these benefits against the burden the Act imposes on
out-of-state spammers, the court held that the burden imposed on in-
45. Id. at 836, 24 P.3d at 411.
46. Id. at 834, 24 P.3d at 410.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 835, 24 P.3d at 410.
49. Heckel, 143 Wash. 2d at 835, 24 P.3d at 410.
50. Id. at 833, 24 P.3d at 410.
51. Id. at836,24 P.3dat 411.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 836-37, 24 P.3d at 411.
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terstate commerce did not exceed the local benefits."5 The only bur-
den that the Act places on spammers is to require them to be truth-
ful. 6 Spammers only incur costs for noncompliance with the Act. 7 If
spammers choose to send deceptive spam, they must filter out email
addresses belonging to Washington residents; otherwise, there are no
costs associated with complying with the Act." The filtering re-
quirement would be considered a burden only if the statute had com-
pletely banned the transmission of all unsolicited email to Washington
residents.5 9
The court also addressed the issues of inconsistency and extrater-
ritoriality. With respect to the inconsistency of laws analysis, the
court noted that seventeen other states at the time of the ruling had
passed legislation to regulate unsolicited email.6" Although no other
state had a truthfulness requirement similar to Washington's, the Act
did not conflict with the requirements of any other states' laws. It is
improbable that any state would pass a law that would require the use
of misleading subject lines or transmission paths.61
Further, although some states may impose additional obligations,
such as requiring subject lines to contain "ADV" or "ADV-
ADLT,"62 these will not be inconsistent for purposes of the dormant
Commerce Clause analysis.63 The question is not whether different
anti-spain laws exist in other states, but whether those differences cre-
ate compliance costs that are "clearly excessive in relation to the puta-
tive local benefits."64 In this case, the different anti-spain laws did not
impose extraordinary costs on the transmission of commercial spam.65
Finally, the court held that the Act did not violate the extraterri-
toriality principle of the dormant Commerce Clause because there was
no sweeping effect that outweighed the local benefits of the Act.66
The Act only targets the conduct of spammers who send email to
55. Heckel, 143 Wash. 2d at 836-37, 24 P.3d at 411.
56. Id. at 836, 24 P.3d at 411.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 836-37, 24 P.3d at 411.
59. Id. at 837, 24 P.3d at 411.
60. Heckel, 143 Wash. 2d at 838, 24 P.3d at 411.
61. See id.
62. Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 94 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1258 (2002). ADV indicates
that the message is an advertisement, and ADV-ADLT indicates that the advertisement pertains
to adult material.
63. Heckel, 143 Wash. 2d at 838, 24 P.3d at 412.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 839, 24 P.3d at 412.
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Washington residents; it does not regulate messages opened out of the
state.67
A. Proscription of Unsolicited Sexually Explicit Email in Washington
Washington's Commercial Electronic Mail Act could be, and
should be, amended to proscribe all unsolicited sexually explicit email
sent into Washington State in such a way as to not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. This proposed law would make it unlawful to ini-
tiate, conspire with another to initiate, or assist in the transmission of
an unsolicited commercial email message that contains sexually ex-
plicit material if that transmission either comes from a computer lo-
cated in Washington or is sent to an electronic mail address that the
sender knows, or has reason to know, is held by a Washington resi-
dent.68
The analysis employed by the court in Heckel is applicable by
analogy to this proposed amendment. The proposed amendment does
not discriminate against out-of-state residents. Because the new law
would apply evenhandedly to both Washington residents and non-
residents, the Pike balancing test, and not strict scrutiny, would ap-
ply.69
1. Legitimate State Interest
The Pike balancing test first requires that the state have a legiti-
mate local public interest.7 In this case, Washington has a substantial
legitimate interest in protecting the moral and psychological welfare of
its children.7 Additionally, the State has an interest in creating laws
that promote and support the right of parents to raise their children as
they see fit.72 "The custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include prepara-
tion for obligations that the state can neither supply nor hinder."73
This proposed amendment would prevent the transmission of unsolic-
ited sexually explicit images to children and enable parents to have
more control over their children's reading material.74
Further, the proposed law would effectively redress the problem
of children's exposure to sexually explicit material. As discussed pre-
67. Id.
68. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.190.020; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.68.050-.060 (2002).
69. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
70. Id.
71. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636.
72. Id. at 639.
73. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
74. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
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viously, three out of ten email messages are unsolicited, and more than
30% of all unsolicited email contains sexually explicit material.7" It is
not only adults who have email addresses; children have them too.
76
By proscribing the transmission of these unsolicited messages into
Washington, the risk of unwanted exposure to children would be sig-
nificantly reduced.
2. Burden on Interstate Commerce
The second part of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis re-
quires a finding that the burden imposed on interstate commerce does
not outweigh the benefits of proscribing unsolicited sexually explicit
email. 77 Under this proposed law, spammers would be required to fil-
ter out Washington residents when sending unsolicited commercial
email with sexually explicit content.78 Like the costs imposed by the
Commercial Email Act, under the proposed law spammers would only
incur costs for noncompliance. 9  Spammers need only filter out
Washington residents if they send messages with sexually explicit
content. 80 Further, the filtering requirement would not be considered
a burden because the proposed legislation does not prohibit the trans-
mission of all unsolicited email; it prohibits only those messages con-
taining sexually explicit material.8
3. Inconsistency and Extraterritoriality
Proscribing the transmission of unsolicited sexually explicit email
would not violate the inconsistency or the extraterritoriality principles
of the dormant Commerce Clause. Currently, only one other state,
West Virginia, prohibits the transmission of sexually explicit email.8 2
West Virginia prohibits the unsolicited transmission of sexually ex-
plicit email to a West Virginia resident.8 " Because the terms of Wash-
ington's statute do not facially conflict with the proposed law, and be-
75. Pastore, supra note 2; McGuire, supra note 3.
76. Spamming: The Email You Want to Can: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommuni-
cations, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999) (statement of Hon.
Heather Wilson, Member, U.S. House of Rep.).
77. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
78. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.190.020(2) (2000) (providing that a person "knows" that
he or she intended a recipient of a commercial electronic mail message to be a Washington resi-
dent if that information is available, upon request, from the registrant of the Internet domain
name contained in the recipient's electronic mail address).
79. Cf. Heckel, 143 Wash. 2d at 836, 24 P.3d at 411.
80. Cf.id.at836-37,24P.3dat411.
81. Cf. id. at 837,24 P.3d at 411.
82. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6G-2 (1999), State of West Virginia, available at http://www.
spamlaws.com/state/wv.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2002).
83. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6G-2 (1999).
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cause West Virginia is the only other state to proscribe these mes-
sages, there would be no inconsistency among the laws of the states.84
Further, it is very unlikely that states would require the transmission
of unsolicited sexually explicit email, so there is no appreciable con-
cern of future conflict. 85
Finally, the proposed amendment would not violate the extrater-
ritoriality principle of the dormant Commerce Clause. Like the cur-
rent Commercial Electronic Mail Act, there is no sweeping effect that
would outweigh the local benefits of the proposed law.86 It only tar-
gets the conduct of spammers who send email to Washington resi-
dents.8"
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF SEXUALLY EXPLICIT
MATERIAL
States are not permitted to make laws that impermissibly abridge
free speech.88 When assessing the constitutionality of a regulation,
courts will consider whether the statute is a content-neutral or a con-
tent-based regulation. 89
Content-neutral statutes are defined as such because of the sec-
ondary effects of the material, rather than because of the impact of the
content on the reader.9" Legitimate secondary effects include preven-
tion of crime, maintenance of property values, and the protection of
residential neighborhoods.91 If a statute is content-neutral, it need
only serve a substantial governmental interest and allow for reasonable
alternative avenues of communication to be upheld as constitutional. 92
However, this lower standard of review is not afforded to content-
based regulations that target the effects of protected speech. 93
Regulations that are imposed because of the harmful effect the
content will have on minors are considered to be content-based regula-
tions.94 Although content-based regulations are presumptively uncon-
stitutional and subject to strict scrutiny review,95 a finding that a stat-
84. Cf. Heckel, 143 Wash. 2d at 838, 24 P.3d at 412.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 839, 24 P.3d at 412.
87. Id. at 838, 24 P.3d at 412.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
89. Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1996).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 385.
92. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986).
93. See United States v. Playboy, 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000).
94. Id.
95. Crawford, 96 F.3d at 385; see Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989).
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ute is content-based does not foreclose the possibility that it is consti-
tutional."
A statute will pass constitutional muster if it serves a compelling
state interest and is the least restrictive means to further that interest.
97
The scope of the statute must be narrow in order to prevent unneces-
sary burdens on free speech.98 If a less restrictive alternative exists,
then the statute is unconstitutional. 99 However, the less "restrictive
alternative must be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate pur-
pose that the statute was enacted to serve."1 '
Finally, a statute that is either overbroad or vague will also vio-
late the First Amendment.' 0' A statute is overbroad if it not only bans
speech unprotected by the Constitution, but also bans speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 0 2 A statute is vague if the definition
of what constitutes forbidden speech is so clearly undefined that a rea-
sonable person would have to guess at its meaning. 10 3
The courts have recognized a compelling interest in protecting
the physical and psychological well-being of minors."0 4 This interest
includes shielding minors from the influence of material that is not ob-
scene by adult standards.' While the First Amendment does not
constitutionally protect speech that is considered to be obscene,
10 6
sexually explicit, or indecent, speech that is not obscene to adults but
is obscene to minors is protected by the Constitution." 7
A. Cases Where State Regulations Have Been Found Constitutional
In Ginsberg v. New York, the United States Supreme Court up-
held a New York criminal obscenity statute that made it unlawful to
sell material to minors (under age 17) that was obscene to minors but
not necessarily obscene to adults.' The statute under examination,
and upheld as constitutional in Ginsberg, defined material as obscene
to minors if it:
96. Crawford, 96 F.3d at 385.
97. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
98. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997).
99. Id. at 874.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 870, 877.
102. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972).
103. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
104. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
105. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636; Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
106. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636.
107. Seeid. at637.
108. Id. at 632.
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(1) appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of mi-
nors; (2) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult
community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material
for minors; and (3) is utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance for minors.'0 9
While the United States Constitution may protect material in-
tended for adult distribution, it does not necessarily protect restric-
tions placed on the dissemination to minors."' In Ginsberg, the defen-
dant owned and operated a lunch counter at which he sold magazines
containing pictures of female nudity, or "girlie" magazines."' The de-
fendant was charged and found guilty of violating the statute when he
sold two of these girlie magazines to a 16-year-old boy."' Applying
strict scrutiny analysis, the Court first determined that the statute was
not overly broad because businesses may continue to stock the maga-
zines and sell them to adults."'
The Court held that the state has a compelling interest in pre-
venting the distribution of material to minors that is not obscene to
adults, but that is obscene to them.' 14 Two interests support this
regulation."' First, a parent's right to choose how to raise children is
paramount in our society, and that right should be free from state in-
volvement. 116 However, states may enact laws that do not impose a
moral standard on children, but instead support the right of parents to
decide what their children read.' 17 In Ginsberg, the New York statute
did not prevent parents from purchasing the magazines for their chil-
dren.'
Second, states have an interest in safeguarding minors from
abuses that would hinder their development into independent and
well-developed adults."9 Because parents cannot control or provide
guidance to their children twenty-four hours a day, the state also has
an independent interest in the well-being of children.'20
In a similar case addressing the regulation of material obscene to
children but not to adults, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
109. Id. at 632-33.
110. Id. at 636.
111. Id. at632.
112. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 632.
113. Id. at 634.
114. Id. at 636.
115. Id. at 639.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 390 U.S. at 639.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 640.
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Crawford v. Lungren, upheld a California statute that banned the sale
of "harmful matter" in unsupervised sidewalk vending machines.' 21
California's definition of "harmful matter" mirrored that put forth by
the statute in Ginsberg.122 Applying strict scrutiny analysis, the court
first recognized that states have a compelling interest in safeguarding
the physical and psychological welfare of children. 23
A compelling state interest alone is insufficient; the state must
also use the least restrictive means for achieving that interest. 124 Sug-
gesting that the state did not use the least restrictive means, the plain-
tiff in Crawford proposed two possible alternatives for protecting mi-
nors: warning labels and geographic restrictions. 2  However, the
court found neither alternative to be effective. 126 Warning labels
placed on material that would alert the buyer that it contained material
obscene to minors might deter some minors, but would not deter (and
may even attract) the bulk of them. 27 A minor who purchases mate-
rial from an unsupervised public vending machine is anonymous. 28
The hypothesis that a minor will heed the warning is an assumption
the court was not willing to accept. 29
The suggestion of geographic restrictions prohibiting placement
of these machines near schools or in neighborhoods was also unper-
suasive.'13 The effectiveness of this type of restriction relies on the as-
sumption that minors stay within the confines of school grounds and
homes. However, children are mobile-"the assumption that children
are only to be found around schools or at home is ludicrous in today's
society.""'s' Moreover, material located away from school zones and
neighborhoods is even more attractive to minors who want to avoid
detection. 132
121. 96 F.3d at 383.
122. Id. Moreover, California Penal Code § 313(a) defines harmful matter as "matter taken
as a whole, which to the average person, applying contemporary statewide standards, appeals to
the prurient interest, and is matter which, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value for minors."
123. Id. at 386.
124. Id. at 387.
125. Id.
126. Crawford, 96 F.3d at 387.
127. Id. at 388 ("Although the state presented no evidence to that effect, we hardly think
that evidence is required.").
128. Id.
129. Id. ("It borders on absurd to say that a youngster would be deterred by an announce-
ment which said something like [This publication] is highly explicit and is intended for adults for
the age of 21 only.").
130. Id.
131. Crawford, 96 F.3d at 388.
132. See id.
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Finally, the statute was not too prohibitively invasive of any
adults' interest in obtaining the material.133 Adults could obtain the
material from alternate sources and in alternate ways.134 Vendors are
still able to distribute publications on the streets through other dis-
tributors.13
B. Cases Where Regulations Have Been Found Unconstitutional
Recent case law suggests that courts are very demanding when
states attempt to regulate speech that is otherwise protected by the
Constitution. For example, in Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court
struck down the Communications Decency Act (CDA), a federal stat-
ute that made it unlawful to knowingly transmit indecent or patently
offensive messages to any recipient under the age of 18. The Court
held that the CDA was an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom
of speech.136 The messages covered under the CDA included all tele-
communications made via the Internet (e.g., email, mail exploders,
newsgroups, chat rooms, and instant messages). 3 7 Under the statute,
a sender was criminally liable for messages sent regardless of whether
he or she placed the call or initiated the communication.3 ' A violation
was punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment not to exceed two
years."'3 The statute also provided for two affirmative defenses, one
covering those who acted in good faith to restrict access by minors and
the other covering those who attempted to restrict access by requiring
proof of age. 140
The CDA was a content-based regulation that failed strict scru-
tiny review because it was overly broad."' In its efforts to deny mi-
nors access to indecent material, the CDA effectively suppressed a
"large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to re-
ceive."' 42 The only way to escape liability under the CDA was to
completely refrain from using indecent speech on the Internet, 43 effec-
tively reducing the level of material on the Internet to that which is
133. Id. at 388.
134. Id. at 387.
135. Id. at 388 ("If merchants do not wish to carry these materials, that is no fault or
business of the State.").
136. Reno struck down 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), which prohibited the knowing transmission of
obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age. 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997).
137. See id. at 876.
138. Id. at 859.
139. Id. at 860.
140. Id. at 869.
141. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 891.
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only suitable for a child.144 Furthermore, the New York statute at is-
sue in Ginsberg permitted parents to purchase the materials for their
children if they so desired, but the CDA had no such provision.14
Under the CDA, neither parental consent nor participation would
have prevented application of the statute.146
The Reno Court also criticized the CDA for not limiting the pro-
hibition to just commercial speech or commercial entities. 47  Com-
mercial speech generally receives less protection under the First
Amendment than other forms of constitutionally protected speech.'48
Unlike the statute in Ginsberg, the CDA criminalized all "nonprofit
entities and individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them
on their computers in the presence of minors." '49
The Court also found it problematic that the CDA criminalized
messages sent to those who were close to reaching majority. 5 The
CDA applied to minors age 18 and younger, but the statute at issue in
Ginsberg only applied to minors age 17 and younger."'
The CDA also failed strict scrutiny review because its definition
of harmful material was vague. In Ginsberg, the New York statute de-
fined "harmful matter" as material that had no redeeming social im-
portance for minors; in the CDA, this limitation did not exist, and the
Act failed to define the term "indecent."'5 2 Consequently, the CDA
effectively banned nonpornographic material as well as material with
educational or some other value.5 3
Finally, the Court invalidated the CDA because it lacked the suf-
ficient narrow precision needed to survive strict scrutiny review.15 4
The burden placed on adult speech is acceptable only if there are no
other less restrictive alternatives that would achieve the state's compel-
ling interest.' The CDA had a chilling effect on speech that would
otherwise receive constitutional protection. 6 There were no effective
means to determine the age of a user, and it would be prohibitively
144. Id. at 875.
145. Id. at 865.
146. Id.
147. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865.
148. Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
149. Id.
150. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865.
151. Id.
152. Id. "The CDA fails to provide us with any definition of the term 'indecent' ... and,
importantly, omits any requirement that the 'patently offensive' material covered by § 223(d)
lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." See id.
153. Id. at 877.
154. Id.
155. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
156. Id.
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expensive to require commercial and noncommercial users to imple-
ment an age verification system." 7 Further, despite its limitations and
availability, software would soon be available that would enable par-
ents to prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit mate-
rial.'58
In another recent decision by the Supreme Court, United States
v. Playboy Entertainment, the Court struck down the Telecommunica-
tions Act's "signal bleed" provision, section 505.'5' Under section
505, cable operators had the option of either "scrambling a sexually
explicit channel in full or of limiting the channel's programming to the
period between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m."' 6 ° Because the scrambling tech-
nology of programming is not perfect, discernable pictures may some-
times appear on the scrambled screen, which is referred to as signal
bleed.' 6' The purpose of section 505 was to protect minors from hear-
ing or seeing images resulting from signal bleed.'62 However, the only
reasonable way to comply with section 505 was to limit programming
within specified time limits.'63 Thus, for two-thirds of the day no
household in the service area could receive the programming, regard-
less of the presence of children and irrespective of the wishes of view-
ers. 16 4
The signal bleed provision was a content-based regulation that
failed strict scrutiny review. 65 The regulation may not have imposed
a complete prohibition, but it did impose a significant burden on adult
programming. 6 6 "The distinction between laws burdening and laws
157. Id. at 876-77.
158. Id. at 877.
159. 529 U.S. 803, 806 (2000).
160. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 808.
161. Seeid. at 807.
162. Id. at 808.
Analog cable television systems may use either 'RF' or 'baseband' scrambling sys-
tems, which may not prevent signal bleed, so discernable pictures may appear from
time to time on the scrambled screen .... The problem is that at present it appears
not to be economical to convert simpler RF or baseband scrambling systems to alter-
native scrambling technologies on a systemwide scale.
Id. at 807-808.
163. Id. at 812.
164. Id. "[Thirty] to 50% of all adult programming is viewed by households prior to 10
p.m., when safe-harbor period begins." Id.
165. Id. at 811. "Section 505 applies only to channels primarily dedicated to 'sexually ex-
plicit adult programming or other programming that is indecent.' The statute is unconcerned
with signal bleed from any other channels." Id.
166. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 812.
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banning speech is but a matter of degree." '167 Content-based regula-
tions are subject to the same rigorous review as content-based bans. 6 '
The Government had a compelling interest in regulating the
transmission of unwanted, indecent speech into homes without paren-
tal consent, but the signal bleed provision violated the First Amend-
ment because there was a less restrictive means available to accomplish
the Government's goal.'69 For example, section 504 of the Telecom-
munications Act, the "opt out" provision, required cable operators to
block channels, free of charge, to individual households upon re-
quest. 7 ' This option was less restrictive of constitutionally protected
free speech than the signal bleed provision.' 7' Moreover, section 504
best supported the Government's goal in supporting parents' desires
to shield their children from possible exposure to sexually explicit ma-
terial. '72
When there exists a less restrictive alternative to a content-based
speech restriction, the Government has the obligation to prove that
the alternative will be ineffective in achieving its goals."7 In this case,
the Government submitted evidence indicating that, while section 504
was available, only a fraction of consumers used it, and was thus inef-
fective.' However, even if an alternative appears be ineffective, the
Government still must "demonstrate that the harms it recites are real
and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material de-
gree.' 175
In Playboy, there was insufficient evidence to prove that signal
bleed was a pervasive, widespread serious problem.'76 The Govern-
ment made generalizations concerning the potential of exposure, but
the true nature and extent of the risk of actual exposure were not ar-
ticulated. 177 For example, no survey-type evidence was submitted that
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 814. "[E]ven where the speech is indecent and enters the home, the objec-
tive of shielding children does not suffice to support a blanket ban if the protection can be ac-
complished by a less restrictive alternative." Id.
170. 47 U.S.C. § 560 (1994 ed., Supp. III); Playboy, 529 U.S. at 809 (stating "upon request
by a cable service subscriber without charge, to fully scramble or otherwise fully block any chan-
nel the subscriber does not wish to receive.").
171. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 809.
172. See id. at 816.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-771 (1993).
176. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 822. "If the number of children transfixed by even flickering
pornographic television images in fact reached into the millions we... would have expected to
be directed to more than a handful of complaints." Id.
177. Id.
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would show the likelihood of exposure to a child.'78 Additionally,
there was no evidence that illustrated the duration of the bleed or the
quality of the pictures or sound.'79
The question of whether individual blocking under section 504
was an effective alternative versus whether signal bleed was a serious,
pervasive problem was a tie at best."8 ' And, a tie is resolved in favor of
free speech. 8'
C. Regulation of Indecent Speech in the State of Washington
Washington can, and should, proscribe the transmission of unso-
licited commercial pornographic email to Washington residents.
Ginsberg recognizes the power of the state to adjust the definition of
obscenity based on its harmful effects on minors."8 2 The free speech
provision of the Washington State Constitution does not give greater
protection to obscenity than the protection afforded by the First
Amendment.' 3 Therefore, an independent state constitutional analy-
sis is not required with respect to obscenity cases heard in Washing-
ton. 184
A Washington law regulating material obscene to minors would
be subject to the same First Amendment analysis that is applied to
federal laws. 8 The courts will not uphold the proposed regulation if
it violates the First Amendment. 6 Because this proposed ban is
premised on the harmful effect on minors, it would likely be character-
ized as a content-based regulation and subject to strict scrutiny re-
view. 7 Thus, the proposed amended law must support a compelling
state interest that employs a narrow means for achieving that interest,
and the problem it seeks to remedy must be pervasive and not specula-
tive."' Finally, the language of the statute must not be overly broad
or vague. 189
178. Id. at 819.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 390 U.S. at 638.
183. State v. Reece, 110 Wash. 2d 766, 776, 757 P.2d 947, 953 (1988).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 776, 757 P.2d at 953.
186. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
187. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
188. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 871, 877; see also Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
189. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 871, 877; see also Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
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1. Compelling Interest
The purpose of the proposed legislation is to protect minors from
unwanted exposure to sexually explicit unsolicited email. The courts
are unanimous in recognizing the protection of minors as a compelling
reason, even though the statute may have failed for other reasons.19 °
Therefore, the proposed legislation is supported by a compelling state
interest: the protection of the psychological welfare of children.191
2. Least Restrictive Means
A complete ban of sending unsolicited email with sexually ex-
plicit content is the least restrictive means for protecting the moral and
psychological welfare of children. An email address can be completely
anonymous and the sender has no way of knowing the age or gender of
the recipient. 92 Admittedly, the supervision of a child's reading mate-
rial is best left to the parents.'93 However, there is justification for
state regulation. Over 28 million school age children have either both
of their parents, or their only parent, in the work force.'94 And, each
week, at least 5 million children are left alone at home without super-
vision.195  Because parents cannot provide guidance and control
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, society's interest in pro-
tecting the welfare of children justifies regulation.'96
A complete ban is the least restrictive and only effective means
for supporting this interest. For example, email messages could be
"flagged" as containing sexually explicit material by inserting warn-
ings into the subject headers that would notify the recipient of the na-
ture of the content; however, these warnings would only be effective as
long as the minor heeded the warning. 97 Furthermore, warning labels
may have the reverse effect and attract young curious eyes."'
Filtering devices would also not be effective means for protecting
minors. While it is true that most email service providers offer the
option of filtering the amount of spam that a person receives, these
provisions are not only ineffective,'99 but also require affirmative steps
190. See, e.g., Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636; Reno, 521 U.S. at 865.
191. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 637.
192. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 876.
193. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640.
194. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 842 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
195. Id.
196. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640.
197. See Crawford, 96 F.3d at 388.
198. Id.
199. Jim Rossman, Spammers Get Around Junk Email Filters, THE DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Oct. 11, 2001, at 3D.
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by the owner of the address. 2°° The presumption that a minor would
enable such a filter is no more persuasive than the argument that a mi-
nor would heed a warning label.2"'
Arguably, parents would be responsible for ensuring that filters
were enabled on their child's email account. °2 But accessing email is
not a medium of communication where only a few of the most enter-
prising and disobedient young people can break through some sophis-
ticated electronic system designed to exclude them.20 3 Increasingly,
children are being encouraged to learn how to navigate on the Inter-
net. 214 Children are able to set up email accounts without their par-
ent's knowledge. Email accounts such as those provided by Hotmail
and Yahoo! can be set up free of charge, without age verification or pa-
rental consent. The ease with which children may obtain access to
email, coupled with the concerns of protecting the moral and psycho-
logical welfare of children, justify the proscription of indecent unsolic-
ited commercial email. 20 5
This provision is distinguishable from the regulation struck
down in Playboy for not being the least restrictive, effective means
available to meet the Government's purpose.20 6 In Playboy, the Court
based its decision on the fact that the Government had failed to prove
the existence of a pervasive problem. 27 However, in this case, there is
ample evidence of a pervasive and serious problem. Thus, an opt-out
provision would not be an effective alternative for three reasons. First,
an opt-out provision in this case would still require the recipient to
view the message before transmitting a reply message regarding their
desire to not receive additional messages. Many parents would object
to exposing their children to messages containing "teaser" images that
invite the recipient to visit an adult site on the Web.20 8 Second, like
the warning labels, there is no assurance that minors will heed the opt-
out provision.
200. Cynthia Flash, Valid Need for 8-Year-Old to Have Email Leads to Garbage Heap of
Junk, THE SEATTLE TIMES, February 16, 2002, available at http://archives
.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=pthotmaill 6&date=
200202 16&query=garbage+heap (last visited Aug. 13, 2002).
201. See Crawford, 96 F.3d at 388.
202. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640.
203. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 130.
204. Cattagni & Farris, supra note 12, at 1.
205. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (finding indecent broadcast
material should be treated different due to ease of which children may obtain access to it).
206. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 826.
207. Id. at 821.
208. Hearings, supra note 76.
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Finally, an opt-out provision would only prevent the transmis-
sion of sexually explicit material from one sender, not all senders.0 9
Unlike the opt-out provision in Playboy, which would prevent the ca-
ble TV provider from providing programming to a particular house-
hold after a single phone call from the consumer, an opt-out provision
in this context would result in many email messages still being sent to
a recipient even after opting out.210 Under an opt-out provision in this
case, the recipient would have the burden of first viewing the objec-
tionable material and then sending individual response messages to
request removal. Playboy dealt with a single source sent to a known
household; unsolicited email, in contrast, originates from many differ-
ent sources and is directed at an unknown recipient2
3. Pervasive Problem
Even if a court accepts that the alternative restrictions may not be
effective, the court may still invalidate the regulation if there is no evi-
dence of a pervasive problem.212 The statute in Playboy addressed ma-
terial transmitted (via cable TV) to some homes where it is not wanted
and where parents often are not present to give immediate guidance." 3
Yet, the Court found that even though the submitted alternative re-
striction may not be effective, the Government failed to prove that a
significant and pervasive problem existed. 214  However, in this case,
there is evidence to support the claim of a pervasive problem.
As discussed in section II of this article, there is statistical data
proving that children are being exposed to sexually explicit material.
Children as young as seven years old are receiving unsolicited sexually
explicit email.215 In this case, there is no speculation; rather, there is
quantifiable evidence. Further, parents are complaining.216 And, even
though this data is not per se collected from Washington State alone,
the existence of a national problem is sufficient to support regulation
of a local nature.217
209. Id.
210. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 826.
211. Hearings, supra note 76 ("Many senders of unsolicited commercial electronic mail col-
lect or harvest electronic mail addresses of potential recipients without the knowledge of those
recipients.").
212. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 826. "[A] tie goes to free expression." Id. at 819.
213. Id. at 813.
214. See id. at 819.
215. 7 Year Old Gets Porn Spain, at http://www.cauce.org/tales/7_yearold.shtml (last
visited July 25, 2002).
216. Flash, supra note 200.
217. See City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52. "The First Amendment does not require a
city... to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by
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4. Overbreadth
Statutes that overly burden constitutionally protected speech are
unconstitutional.218 Generally, states cannot reduce the reading level
to that which is suitable only for children.219 The proposed legislation
is not as broad as the statutes that have been held unconstitutional be-
cause it still permits adults to access material through other mediums
on the Internet 22° and does not impose liability on parents who request
the material on behalf of their children 2 ' Additionally, purveyors do
not incur liability if sexually explicit material is sent to a minor who,
posing as an adult, requested the material to be sent to him or her di-
rectly.
Unlike the Communications Decency Act, in which compliance
effectively required that all indecent speech be eliminated from the
Internet, 222 the proposed legislation would only proscribe the trans-
mission of commercial unsolicited email with sexually explicit content.
Commercial purveyors would still be able to send solicited email as
well as advertise through the all other mediums of communications
available on the Internet. 23 For example, a Washington resident visit-
ing a website could request to be added to a mailing list, and sexually
explicit email could subsequently be sent to that person without incur-
ring liability on either the sender or the recipient. Additionally, the
proposed legislation only proscribes commercial unsolicited email with
sexually explicit content; commercial entities would be able to adver-
tise through unsolicited email as long as the message does not contain
sexually explicit material. Arguably, the ability of a commercial entity
to advertise in Washington may be hindered, but the fact that "pur-
veyors of materials must fend for themselves does not raise a First
Amendment problem. 224
5. Vagueness
Language of the proposed legislation must not be vague in defin-
ing what materials will be banned.225 Washington has a statutory ob-
scenity test for minors that is similar to the New York statute in Gins-
other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant
to the problem that the city addresses." Id.
218. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 522.
219. See Bolger v. Young Drugs Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983).
220. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641.
221. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
222. Id. at 878.
223. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634.
224. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
225. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 871.
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berg and is not fatally flawed like the CDA.226 Under this statute, ma-
terial is obscene to minors when, taken as a whole, it: 1) appeals to the
prurient interest of minors in sex; 2) is patently offensive because it af-
fronts contemporary standards; and 3) is utterly without redeeming
social value.227
The Washington statute is precise in its definition of what is
considered obscene to a minor and, unlike Reno, provides that only
material without redeeming social value will be deemed obscene for
minors.228 Furthermore, the Washington Supreme Court has upheld
this statute as a constitutionally valid definition of obscenity adjusted
for minors. 2 1
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Advances in communications and technology have not vitiated
the ancient concept that "a man's home is his castle into which not
even the king may enter. , 230 The exclusive right and final judgment of
what material enters into the privacy of one's home231 is not an anach-
ronistic concept that should be disregarded under the subterfuge of
"free speech." The transmission of unwanted, unsolicited, sexually
explicit email into private homes is just as offensive as if it were placed
in a regular mailbox. Vendors cannot, under the guise of the First
Amendment, claim a constitutional right to send sexually explicit ma-
terial into a person's home.232 While it is true that as a society we are
often subject to objectionable speech outside the home and that we are
expected to avert our eyes to that which we find offensive, this does
not mean that we must also be captives in the privacy of our homes.233
Parents also have a strong interest in deciding the best method
for rearing their children.234 By not regulating the transmission of un-
solicited commercial email with sexually explicit content, both the
courts and the legislature imply a general societal approval of these ac-
tivities that may amount to encouragement.2 3' Advances in technol-
ogy have not relieved the courts or the legislatures of their interest in
supporting a parent's right to control a child's upbringing."' Laws
226. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68.050 (2001).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Soundgarden v. Eikenberry, 123 Wash. 2d 750, 759, 871 P.2d 1050, 1055 (1994).
230. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
231. Id. at 736.
232. Id.
233. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738.
234. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
235. Id. at641.
236. Id. at 639.
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that regulate the Internet should be enacted and upheld to aid in the
discharge of that responsibility. 237
VI. CONCLUSION
Unsolicited sexually explicit email is not only being sent to adults
but also to children. The Washington Supreme Court's decision to
uphold Washington's current spam law is the stepping stone to shield-
ing children from unwanted exposure and to supporting parents' right
to decide what their children will or will not view. Washington's cur-
rent spam law could be amended to proscribe the transmission of
sexually explicit commercial spam.
The proposed amendment would not violate the dormant Com-
merce Clause because it would impose no greater burden on interstate
commerce than does the current Act. Further, because no other
states, other than West Virginia, have enacted similar statutes, there is
no concern that this law would conflict with other states' laws. The
proposed law for Washington would not conflict with West Virginia
law because both laws would ban the same types of messages.
Proscribing the transmission of sexually explicit spam would also
not violate the First Amendment. Although this provision would be
subject to strict scrutiny, Washington has a compelling interest in pro-
tecting the moral and psychological welfare of its children; this is the
narrowest means for achieving this goal because other available alter-
natives would not be effective in furthering Washington's interest.
Furthermore, prohibiting only unsolicited, and not solicited, sexually
explicit email would not prevent adults from accessing the material via
email if they chose to do so. Thus, the law does not unduly burden
speech that is otherwise protected.
Finally, there are strong policy reasons for prohibiting sexually
explicit spain. First, the State has a substantial interest in enacting
laws that promote and support parents' rights to decide the moral up-
bringing of their children. The proposed amendment to Washing-
ton's Commercial Electronic Mail Act empowers parents with the
ability to choose whether or not their children will receive sexually ex-
plicit email. Finally, the right of a person to communicate with an-
other is not absolute. Although society may permit citizens to be
bombarded with offensive speech outside the home, we are not ex-
pected to be captives and should have the exclusive and final judg-
ment over what material enters our own homes.238
237. Id.
238. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736.
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